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Applications (apps) that conceal their activities are fundamentally deceptive; app 
marketplaces and end-users should treat such apps as suspicious. However, due to its 
nature and intent, activity concealing is not disclosed up-front, which puts users at risk. 
This study focuses on characterization and detection of such techniques, e.g., hiding the 
app or removing traces, known as “self hiding” (SH) behavior. SH behavior has not been 
studied per se – rather it has been reported on only as a byproduct of malware 
investigations. This gap is addressed via a study and suite of static analyses targeted at 
SH in Android apps. 
 SH behavior ranges from hiding the app’s presence or activity to covering an 
app’s traces, e.g., by blocking phone calls/ text messages or removing calls and messages 
from logs. Using static analysis tools on a large dataset of 9,452 Android apps (benign as 
well as malicious) the frequency of 12 such SH behaviors is exposed. It has revealed that 
malicious apps employ 1.5 SH behaviors per app on average. Surprisingly, SH behavior 
is also employed by legitimate (“benign”) apps, which can affect users negatively in 
multiple ways. The approach has high precision and recall (combined F-measure = 
87.19%). This approach is also efficient, with analysis typically taking just 37 seconds 
per app.  
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Mobile security research has mostly focused on malware activation, malicious
payloads, permission abuse, or leaking sensitive data. Little attention has been
paid to deceptive mechanisms that are essential for the success of malware, i.e., how
malware manages to get installed, and continues operating on the phone without the
users noticing anything suspicious. To do so, malware uses a range of SHB, e.g.,
hiding the app, hiding app resources, blocking calls, deleting call records, or blocking
and deleting text messages. Surprisingly, extremely popular “benign” apps such as
Airbnb, Truecaller, and Waze also employ certain SH techniques in the name of user
convenience. We believe that SHB is fundamentally deceptive and that having tools
that perform accurate and early detection of SHB is key. First, app marketplaces,
e.g., Google Play or Apple Store, should be able to detect SHB, so that SHB can
be considered in the decision to publish an app or not. Even when an app with
SHB is published on the marketplace, users should be forewarned about the SHB so
they can decide whether to install the app on their phone or not. We address these
problems on the Android platform via several advances: (1) we shine a light on SHB
via detailed characterization, (2) we construct an SHB-detecting tool based on static
analysis, and (3) we show how our approach for identifying SHB can be very effective




In this section, we provide a comprehensive description of SH behaviors. We define as
SH a behavior meant to hide the app or its actions from being viewed (or heard!) by
the user. Note that we exclude those behaviors meant to evade security mechanisms,
e.g., anti-malware tools or access control mechanisms – they have been studied
thoroughly and are outside the scope of this paper. Our characterization is based
on manual analysis of about 200 malicious apps and automated analysis of about
3,000 other malicious apps. We found 12 SHBs; few of these are even mentioned
in the research community, let alone characterized thoroughly, and some, including
“Hide icon” and “Hide activity”, are not mentioned at all. Users could employ three
main approaches for identifying the presence of malicious apps: inspecting app objects
(icon, app, activity), analyzing remote communication (SMS, MMS, and phone calls)
or checking system reminders (system dialogs, sound, system logs, notifications, recent
apps list, etc). There are two main issues with this approach, though: (1) it requires
a highly knowledgeable user who performs such inspections periodically, and (2)
malware actively attempts to escape (by hiding itself) from such identification.
2.1 App Objects
After installation, benign apps add their icon to the home screen. To hide itself,
a malicious app removes the icon so the user cannot notice the app’s presence. There
are two methods for hiding the icon: (a) Modifying the app’s manifest file to remove
the app from the default launcher, i.e., home screen. This can be done by deleting
category android.intent.category. LAUNCHER from the app’s main activity section
in the manifest file. For example, malware Fake-skype camouflages as the popular app
Skype and runs in the background without an icon in the home screen. (b) Calling an
2
Figure 2.1 The numbers of SHBs in two sample sets of 1,000 malware apps and
1,000 benign apps, respectively.
Android API method to disable the icon at runtime. This can be done by invoking
method setComponentEnabledSetting(). For example, malware Facebook-otp (full
package name: jgywwv.jvyjsd.sordvd), masquerades as the Facebook app but disables
its icon immediately after installation. When benign apps are running, they typically
show up in the running app list. In contrast, a malicious app can run as a service, in
the background, hence does not show up in the list.
2.2 Remote Communication
Sending SMS/MMS messages furtively, in the background, is a common
behavior in malware. Therefore, several anti-malware products focus on this to
recognize malware. After sending or receiving SMS/MMS in the background, Android
saves a copy of the SMS/MMS in the outbox or inbox, respectively. To cover its tracks,
malware needs to delete this copy. The malware usually calls delete() on a content
URI, i.e., “content :// sms/inbox/” and “content :// sms/outbox/”, respectively.
Furthermore, malware can also delete SMS/MMS associated with a certain message
ID, time, or phone number. An example is malware XTaoAd.A that deletes a message
upon receipt. After a malicious app sends SMS/MMS to sign up for a premium-rate
service in the background, it will receive a confirmation SMS/MMS sent from the
3
service provider. To prevent users from knowing this, the malware has to filter the
received SMS/MMS by calling abortBroadcast().
2.3 System Reminders
System dialogs could reveal the presence of malware by displaying alarms, user
account balances, or other abnormal behaviors to the user. To avoid this, malware has
to dismiss the system dialog by broadcasting the intent ACTION CLOSE SYSTEM
DIALOGS.
Apps can send alerts to the user by generating a notification on the notification
bar. But the malware can delete notifications by calling NotificationManager’s
methods cancel() or cancelAll() when receiving notifications. To cover their presence,
malicious apps often resort to muting the phone or disabling the vibrate function,
to prevent the user from hearing the sound of alarms, notifications, phone calls or
incoming SMSs. This can be accomplished in a variety of ways: switching to silent
mode, calling the vibrator service, setting the phone to mute, or adjusting the volume
to the lowest level. After an app has run, the system puts its activities into the
recent apps list. To prevent this, malware can set the flag excludeFromRecents in the
manifest file, or by calling ActivityManager.setExcludeFromRecents(). Android saves
system activity into the system log, which can be viewed via the logcat. Malware can





Our approach relies on a suite of static analyses to detect SHBs. Figure 2 shows an
overview of our tool’s design. The input is an APK file (APK is the format Android
apps are distributed in). We pass the bytecode to Soot [3]/FlowDroid [4] which
perform basic tasks such as alias analysis, call graph analysis, as well as fixpoint
computations to deal with loops and recursion. Next, we perform our core analyses
(described shortly) on both bytecode and XML files. Finally, a report detailing the
potential SHBs is produced.
3.1 Static Analysis
Our first analysis finds whether SH API calls are invoked (we name this SAPI
analysis for short). We present the analysis in Figure 3. Specifically, the analysis
starts at an Origin (app or activity start). In the first stage, we use control-flow and
call graph analysis to find whether a certain SAPI call is invoked , green nodes
and edges on the left represent methods and call graph edges, respectively. In
the second stage, we use backward dataflow analysis to find if the call is invoked
with certain SH-indicating parameters; more precisely, we walk the def-use chains
backwards (shown in black) until we can find the parameter definition, e.g., a
constant or an alias. For example, to detect the “Hide app” SHB, our analysis
will check whether the call to Context.startService() is reachable when starting in
BroadcastReceiver.onReceive().To check for “Delete message” on the other hand,
we start tracking from BroadcastReceiver . onReceive(SMS RECEIVED ACTION
VIEW) to see if we can reach ContentResolver.Delete(); next, we walk the def-use
chains backwards to see if the argument is “content :// sms”. For certain behaviors,
















Figure 3.1 Tool overview.
are provided by FlowDroid. Another broad self-hiding category consists of pair
actions, where an app first performs a malicious action then deletes traces of this
action, e.g., deleting a text message after sending it. Our analysis (we name this
PAPI analysis for short) detects six types of pair actions: send message/delete,
message log, receive message/delete message log, receive/block message, make phone
call/delete call log, receive phone call/delete call log, receive/block phone call. Our
pair action detector uses data flow analysis in a manner similar to taint analysis
to see if data flows from a pair start to a pair end. To reduce potential false
positives in cases where SAPI methods are also used by benign apps, we perform
a user-decision analysis that checks whether an API method invocation is the result
of a user decision. We name this UD analysis for short. The user’s GUI actions
can be decision-related or decision-unrelated, as explained next. Decision-related
actions include clicking a button, checking a checkbox or selecting a menu item;
in other words, the user takes decisions (and acts accordingly) in a way meant to
change the app state. Examples of decision-unrelated actions include scrolling down
a window or changing focus. If an SAPI is invoked by a decision-related action,
we rule that call as legitimate, rather than an SH attempt. However, if invoked by
a decision-unrelated action, it can be an SHB. Note that existing research can only
detect whether an API is invoked by a GUI , whereas we further consider whether the





























Figure 3.2 SAPI analysis.
we introduce several definitions. User-Decision-GUI (UDG) is an interactive GUI
element, e.g., Button, Checkbox, Radio Button, Toggle Button, Spinner, Picker, or
menu. User-Decision-Callback (UDC) is a top-level callback method directly invoked
as a result of the user action, e.g., onClick(), onCheckedChanged(). In contrast,
some callback methods are due to decision-unrelated actions, e.g., onBackPressed(),
onScroll(), onEditorAction(). Android offers two ways for creating a correspondence
between a callback method and a GUI element: statically defining the call-back as
the handler of an event in the GUI element’s layout file or dynamically defining
a callback for the GUI element by registering a listener object – we handle both.
We determine that a given callback is an UDC if either of these two conditions is
satisfied: (1) The corresponding GUI of the callback is an UDG, and the event to
be handled by the callback is a decision-related event, e.g., click. Note that there
exist decision-unrelated events, e.g., scroll and focus change. (2) The corresponding
GUI of the callback is an UDG, and the listener of the callback is decision-related,
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e.g., onCheckedChangeListener . Note that there exist decision-unrelated listeners,
e.g., onCreateContextMenuListener and onFocusChangeListener. Finally, we infer
that an API invocation is user-decided if all of its callbacks are UDC, which includes
callbacks within the same component and callbacks in other components. If any
callback is not UDC, we infer that the API call is not invoked by the user. Further,
if this call is an SAPI, it is potentially an SHB. This analysis detects activity hiding,
i.e., whether an activity is terminated prematurely, before being displayed. To achieve
this, the activity calls finish () within onCreate() , onStart() , or onResume() (or their
descendants in the call graph). Therefore, our analysis starts at the beginning of these
three callback methods. We perform a control flow analysis to check whether there
exists a path from the beginning of the callback to the callback’s end that includes
finish(); if such a path exists, it indicates potential activity hiding. We name this AF
analysis for short. The purpose of this analysis is to check whether the app attempts
to manipulate activity attributes in order to deceive the user. The analysis checks
both the XML manifest file and the attribute-related API methods. For example,
the liner layout of an activity has an attribute “background color”. If the attribute
value is (hex value)00000000, the activity is transparent. An app can set the value
of an attribute in the manifest or layout files, or by calling certain API methods,
e.g., setBackgroundDrawable(), setBackgroundColor() or setBackgroundResource().
Another example is the attribute excludeFromRecents which can be specified in the
manifest file, or set via the API methods setFlags() and addFlags() . We use SAPI,
PAPI, UD, AF, and Attribute to denote the five static analyses. We now explain each
rule. Rule 1 reports “Hide icon” when the main activity is removed from the home
screen without user involvement. Rule 2 detects “Hide app” if starting an app as a
service without user involvement. Rule 3 reports “Hide activity” when the activity
finish analysis returns true or the main activity is transparent. Rule 4 infers behavior
“Delete message” when deleting occurs after receiving or sending a message. Rule
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5 reports “Delete call log” when deleting occurs after making or receiving a phone
call. Rule 6 detects “Block message” if blocking received or sent messages. Rule 7
reports “Block call” when blocking incoming or outgoing phone calls. Rule 8 reports
“Hide alert” if the app closes a system dialog without user involvement. Rule 9 infers
behavior “Hide notification” when canceling a notification without user intervention.
Rule 10 detects “Mute phone” when muting the phone surreptitiously. Rule 11 finds
SHB “Exclude from recent apps list” if the attribute EXCLUDE FROM RECENTS
is set without user’s involvement. Rule 12 reports “Delete system log” if that specific
shell command is not launched by the user.
3.2 Implementation
We implemented our tool on top of the Soot and FlowDroid static analysis
frameworks. These frameworks only analyze bytecode, so we added modules to
analyze XML files (e.g., categories and attributes in AndroidManifest.xml, style.xml,
etc). Our static analysis modules use both data-flow and control-flow analyses.
Finally, the analysis results are produced using the detection rules.
3.3 Limitations
Our tool has several analysis limitations. First, if an SHB is invoked by
GUI interaction but the GUI text does not reflect the invocation of the SHB, the
tool will not report it; Huang et al.’s idea of finding mismatches between user
interface and app behavior could be used to address this limitation. Second, there
were a few apps that, due to obfuscation, could not be analyzed, e.g., TripAdvisor
(com.tripadvisor.tripadvisor.apk) and KCLS (com.bibliocommons.kcls.apk). Our
analysis, built on top of FlowDroid, is based on over-approximation, and handles
reflection/native code conservatively, this can be a source of false positives. Also,
the SAPI functions with zero parameters tend to have more false positives, a more
9
precise alias and flow analysis would improve precision. There could be other classes
of SHBs, beyond the ones we have discovered. Nevertheless, our list of SHBs: (1) is
effective at malware discrimination, and (2) exposes questionable practices in benign
apps. Finally, our approach cannot recognize specific malware families: certain SHBs
might span multiple malware families. This is expected, as our design goal was at a




In this section, we present an evaluation of our approach along several dimensions:
Is the approach effective at identifying SHBs? Is the approach efficient? What are
the main causes of false positives/false negatives? We begin by describing the two
datasets used in our evaluation. Our first dataset, which we name MA-198, contains
198 malware samples that were decompiled and analyzed manually, in detail. The 198
samples come from the Malware Genome Project [5], Drebin [2], and AndroZoo [1].
The second dataset, which we name ALL-9452, consists of 6,233 benign apps and 3,219
malicious apps. These apps were analyzed automatically. To ensure that the benign
set does not contain malware, we sent all the apps in this set to VirusTotal, a public
malware scanning service. If an app is reported by at least one common anti-virus
tool as malicious, we removed it from the benign set. For the malware samples, we
performed a quick and simple static analysis to eliminate the samples without any
possibility to have SHBs. This is done by searching requested permissions, major
SAPI calls and intent actions. For example, if an app does not have permissions
SEND SMS and RECEIVE SMS, it is impossible to have the SHB “Delete message”.
Moreover, in order to make sure that the samples are malware, we sent them to
VirusTotal. If an app was reported malicious by less than two scanners, we removed
it from the malware set. The static analysis tool ran on an 8-core Intel Xeon i7-4770
(8MB Cache, 3.4 GHz) with 32GB of RAM. The system ran Ubuntu 14.04.1, Linux
kernel version 3.13.0-32-generic.
4.1 Effectiveness
The test for evaluating effectiveness consists of two steps: SHB detection
validation (manual) and large scale measurement (automatic). As there is no existing
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oracle to determine SHB, we manually verified each static analysis report. Specifically,
we reverse-engineered each app, decompiled the app (to source code) via the JADX
decompiler. Note that decompilation is not always possible due to obfuscation, so
some of our manual analysis was based on source code inspection, some on Dalvik
bytecode inspection. This yields an F-measure of 85.71%, indicating that our tool is
quite effective. A sample is identified as malicious if it exhibited any one of the SH
behaviors. The tool missed (false negatives, or ‘FN’) 311 samples from the malware
set, hence the recall value is 90.62%. The tool also reported 996 benign apps as
having SHB (false positives, or ‘FP’) from the benign set, hence the precision is
84.02%. While these 996 apps were not malicious, their use of SHB is questionable
– we discuss such uses at length in Section 5. Finally, the F-measure is 87.19%; the
malware set exhibited 1.5 SHB per sample on average5 while the benign set exhibited
only 0.2 SHB per sample. We believe that the high F-measure value and the per-app
figures of 1.5 SHB (malicious) vs 0.2 (benign) indicate that our approach is effective
for detecting SHB (and perform SHB-based triaging) in Android apps. To better
understand the causes of false positives, in Figure 4.1 we have grouped them by SHBs.
Five SHBs, “hide activity”, “hide notification”, “hide icon”, “hide app” and “delete
system log”, generated the most false positives. We investigated this and found that
the false positives were due to several reasons: (1) Certain apps employ SHB, such as
running in the background without the user having started the app, or without the
user being able to see that running app, in the name of improving user experience
(see Section 5). (2) Static Analysis: alias, data-flow, and control-flow analyses are
over-approximating, which is inherent in static analysis. We have categorized the
false negative sources as follows: (1) Parameters of an SHB are dynamically sent
from a remote-control server, hence our static analysis cannot identify the behavior.
For example, spyware Saveme has a remote server that sends the id, time or phone
number through the network to delete certain SMS/MMS messages. (2) SHBs are
12
Figure 4.1 FPs generated by each SHB.
launched by GUI interaction, but the behavior mismatches the content shown on the
GUI. For example, apps Pure girl and iCalendar employ this behavior. (3) Some
malware samples do not have SHB, though they do invoke SAPI calls, e.g., Towelroot
and FakeCMC. Our tool did not identify these samples as malicious.
4.2 Efficiency
Running our tool on the 9,452 apps took about 10 days. The datasets had
substantial variety in terms of app size, and some apps’ bytecode size was as large as
24 MB. The “Time” grouped columns show running time statistics for each dataset.
We focus on AA-9452 as it is larger, hence more representative. The mean analysis
time was 84 seconds while the median was 37 seconds, which shows that our analysis
is practical. Finally, we believe that even the maximum analysis time of 15,290
seconds (i.e.,4 hours 15 minutes) is acceptable for a static analysis. To conclude, with
a median analysis time of 37 seconds on a median app size of 2.4MB we believe that
our approach is efficient at SHB analysis.
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CHAPTER 5
SELF-HIDING BEHAVIOR IN BENIGN APPS
For each SHB category our tool has found in benign apps, we performed a
two-part targeted manual investigation: first, we analyzed the disassembled bytecode,
and then ran the app with instrumentation to confirm the SHB. We focused this
investigation on two categories of apps: (1) apps that are very popular, e.g., with
more than 100 million installs; or (2) less popular apps which displayed severe cases
of SHB. Ultimately, we aimed to answer the questions “Why does this SH behavior
occur and what are the consequences for the user?” This section summarizes some of
our findings; we limit the discussion to 8 SHBs for brevity.
5.1 Hide App
Many popular benign apps, such as Airbnb and BBM start themselves as an
automatic service after receiving the BOOT COMPLETED event. This event, which
requires the permission RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED, notifies the app that the
system has rebooted. In conjunction with this event and permission, there is a
function which launches the auto-start service. Our tool reports this as “Hide app”
SHB. Apps employ this technique as a means to initialize app-specific information
and functions upon startup. While it could be argued that the app is not hiding in
the malicious sense (rather it is running in the background to have access to certain
types of data, most commonly, location services), we believe that users should know
when such apps are running: (1) so they understand why the battery is draining, and
(2) so they understand the privacy implications of apps accessing and transmitting
sensitive information (e.g., location) in the background.
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5.2 Hide Notification
Certain apps, such as Waze, Truecaller, All in One Toolbox, Quick Heal Mobile
Security and MiniFetion use NotificationManager. cancel() or NotificationManager-
.cancelAll() to block notifications without user intervention. As a result these apps
have been marked as having the “Hide notification” SHB. This is due to the nature
of cancel() and cancelall() , which cancel all previously-shown notifications. Apps
employ this technique as a means to update the user to the most recent notification
or to consolidate notifications, especially in communication apps such as MiniFetion
and TrueCaller. Lately, many “clean up” and “device maintenance” apps have
started to exhibit this behavior for the same reasons. Consolidated notifications
may appear convenient to the user; however the app does not have a means to show
high-priority notifications first (other than through chronological order). Therefore,
users might prefer to receive notifications for all messages to reduce the risk of
missing an important notification. However, in the case of Waze, the app blocks
certain notifications using Vanagon Notification Manager which cancels all app
notifications when the user is not driving. While the app might be trying to appear
helpful, notification cancellation and blocking without user’s consent/awareness is
questionable at best.
5.3 Mute Phone
Our tool discovered the use of AudioManager.setRingerMode() in the benign
app Camera360.As its name states, this is a camera app which edits and takes photos;
it has more than 100 million installs and was “Best App of 2016 on Google Play in
several countries”. Many camera apps use volume controls when recording audio.
Our tool also discovered the “Mute phone” SHB in certain benign popular apps like
Smart Truck Route and All in One Toolbox due to the use of Vibrator.cancel() and
AudioManager.setRingerMode(). Regarding Smart Truck Route, the app directly
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checks and manipulates the device’s audio settings, including its ringer mode. As for
All in One Toolbox, the app mutes the phone based on the SDK version of the device.
This is dubious behavior for a utility app aimed at optimizing the Android device.
To sum up, even though it seems reasonable in some of these cases, we believe that
muting the phone should be done by the user through a system-wide control rather
than silently by the app.
5.4 Block Message
As the BroadcastReceiver is usually a dormant app component, it is not
surprising that its methods can be categorized as SHBs, especially abortBroadcast().
As a result, many benign apps can exhibit this behavior. Interestingly, these apps
are not limited to those which rely heavily on BroadcastReceiver. For example,
the popular navigation app Waze uses abortBroadcast() which can be construed as
the “Block Message” SHB. The abortBroadcast() method is used to prevent other
receivers from obtaining the broadcast, thus blocking the communication. It might
be justified that Waze employs this tactic as a means to prevent itself from getting
location-based alerts that may be irrelevant or annoying to the user. While the
intentions of message-blocking apps might appear benign, such blocking removes
decision-making from the user and can interfere with usability.
5.5 Block Call
Apps which use ITelephony.endCall() are considered to have the “Block Call”
SHB. The benign app Truecaller has the sole purpose to identify and block spam
calls, hence it was obviously marked to have this behavior. Despite explicitly stating
that it automatically blocks calls, an app which decides for the user which calls are
spam can be maliciously manipulated against the user’s interest.
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5.6 Hide Icon
“Hide icon” achieves its goal by deleting an activity’s category. LAUNCHER
from the Android manifest. While this deletion merely indicates that that activity
should appear as an initial activity of a task, it is evident that a deceitful app can
use hide-icon to promote other activities, masking the deceitful app beneath. Many
popular benign apps such as ES File Explorer and Next Launcher 3D Shell Lite have
this behavior. For example, app Next Launcher 3D Shell Lite is a premium launcher
for Android’s home screen, but one of its key features is that it draws 3D icons and
widgets over their original counterparts. App ES File Explorer has permissions to
draw over apps, which is surprising and might be regarded as excessive for a file
manager. By having the ability to promote certain activities and controlling the
launcher’s top level apps, apps with this SHB should be treated with caution.
5.7 Delete Call Log
The app Quick Heal Mobile Security exemplifies this SHB. The app uses Content
Resolver Delete() to delete the call logs on the device. The app has call filtering
capabilities and has explicit permissions to read and write call logs on the user’s
device. Nevertheless, (1) users may not be aware of the security implications of log
deletion, and (2) the user does not initiate call deletion. These two factors make this
particular SHB instance quite problematic.
5.8 Delete System Log
MiniFetion, an app from the Baidu app marketplace, sends free SMS to the
user’s contacts. Despite the seemingly straightforward nature of the app, we found
two highly questionable behaviors. First, the app deletes the system log via “logcat
-c”. Second, the app has an activity MobClickAgent which uploads device logs to
a third party server. Thus the app is able to manipulate, as well as exfiltrate, the
17
system logs without the user’s awareness. While not many popular apps have this
SHB, users need to be extremely suspicious of any app which send device logs and




Motivated by the common tendency of Android malware to self-hide in order to
deceive users and cover malicious traces, we define a set of self-hiding behaviors and
construct a suite of static analyses to reveal such behavior. Our experiments indicate
that the presence of self-hiding behavior is strongly associated with malice in a given
app. Nevertheless, we also found plenty of benign, widely-popular apps that employ
hiding techniques, which suggests that end-users and marketplaces would benefit from
using an approach like ours to shed light on potential nefarious behavior in Android
apps and improve user experience.
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